Thursday, November 19, 2026

WhiteHorse Finance: BDC Pursuing Strategic Alts, Continuation Fund Rumor

WhiteHorse Finance (WHF) (~$175MM market cap) is another subscale BDC, this one is managed by H.I.G. Capital (~$70B AUM, ~15+B of that is private credit), trading at a significant discount to NAV that announced it is pursuing strategic alternatives (announced 9/15/26).  In late 2025, after a few troubled credits started to reduce cash interest income, WHF cut the dividend from $0.385/share to $0.25/share.  That set off the vicious cycle of retail selling, an uncertain NAV widening the discount further, the discount preventing accretive equity issuance, small scale pressuring the spread further and so on.  In Q3, the company reported core net interest income of $0.224/share, short of their current dividend.  Rising rates is also hurting WHF, next month they have a $75MM bond maturing with a 4.00% coupon they'll have to refinance, current market rates are considerable higher, 7.5% range, pressuring the net interest spread by another $0.03/share quarterly.  The reset dividend is no longer sustainable, the structure no longer works.

On October 6th, Pitchbook reported: 

Private credit manager WhiteHorse Capital is pursuing a credit secondaries transaction involving its publicly traded BDC that is set to move $680 million of private credit assets into a continuation vehicle, according to market sources.

The transaction would transfer all assets from the BDC, WhiteHorse Finance (Nasdaq: WHF), into a closed-end continuation vehicle backed by private credit secondaries investors, sources said. The continuation vehicle transaction will provide liquidity to WhiteHorse investors and lead to the delisting of the public BDC, which trades below its book value.

Bids for the continuation vehicle, which primarily includes first-lien direct-lending assets, are in the high 90s, sources said.

The BDC portfolio’s fair value was about $569 million as of June 30, according to public filings. Sources said the continuation vehicle also includes assets from the firm’s joint venture with the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, bringing the total to about $680 million.

Jefferies is advising on the process.

WhiteHorse Finance originates and invests in loans to privately held, lower middle market companies. WhiteHorse Capital is the direct lending arm of HIG Capital.

Jefferies declined to comment. WhiteHorse did not respond to requests for comment.

This sounds similar to what TCPC was able to accomplish when deleveraging their portfolio and proving out their marks at 95 cents, validating there are investors out there willing to take down private credit secondaries.  If executed, this would amount to a liquidation disguised as a continuation fund.  Private credit loans are not really intended to be traded, direct lenders maintain relationships with the borrower and borrowers don't want to introduce a new lender into their loan facility (trades usually require "borrower's consent").  A continuation fund is an elegant solution, H.I.G. could maintain the assets under the manager and not disrupt their relationship with the borrower/sponsor.

The stock currently trades for $7.95/share or a discount of approximately ~33% to its stated NAV of $11.82 (NAV actually went up a few cents from Q2 to Q3).  The portfolio is relatively clean compared to the discount (low software exposure), although the consolidated fair value is 96.75 of cost, despite some visible issues (25% pre-2022 vintage, some restructured positions).  Despite the "high-90s" report, I'd probably haircut it a bit more to the 90% of NAV range to account for some expenses and other leakage.  Call it $10.50 liquidation value via a continuation fund or ~30% upside to current prices.

For those that like it simplified into an AI slop slide:


Disclosure: I own shares of WHF

Saturday, November 14, 2026

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp: Deleveraged, For Sale Sign

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp (TCPC) (~$345MM market cap) is a BDC launched in 2012 that was externally managed by Tennenbaum Capital Partners ("TCP") until April 2018 when BlackRock (BLK) purchased TCP and rebranded the BDC.  In late 2023, TCPC announced a merger with fellow BlackRock managed BDC, BlackRock Capital Investment Corp (BCIC), that was intended to scale the platform and provide a growth vehicle for BlackRock's private credit business.  However, credit issues started appearing in late 2024 as covid-era loans began floating to the surface as the economy normalized.  The stock went from trading 90+% of NAV to around 80%.  As private credit fears started percolating in late 2025 and into 2026, TCPC traded as low as 50% of NAV.  It was clear the franchise value to BlackRock was broken and in August the BDC announced a large "Portfolio Sale" (roughly half of its portfolio) via a continuation fund and a review of strategic alternatives.

The Portfolio Sale transferred $523MM of investments (portions of 78 private credit loans) to the continuation fund for 95% of the 12/31/25 marks to continuation fund sponsored by Pantheon, with TCPC retaining a 5% economic interest in the newly formed fund ("Special Value Continuation Partners").  BlackRock is going to manage the fund without compensation.  Following the Portfolio Sale, TCPC is almost completely deleveraged, reducing NAV deterioration risk and validating their intention to sell the BDC.


On the downside, the remaining portfolio has some concentration issues, particularly with an equipment-financing platform called 36th Street Capital which TCPC controls (~$49MM in a 12% senior note, ~$53MM in equity membership units), the lessor is profitable but highly leveraged with little disclosures.  The other concentration is in software loans, which the market is still particularly concerned about.

A sale transaction makes the most sense as an outcome of the strategic alternatives process:

  • Post Portfolio Sale, the standalone investment income no longer supports the dividend, BDCs need to be leveraged in order to pay its expenses and provide a ~10% yield that retail investors desire.
  • BlackRock has been waiving portions of their base management fees and with the Portfolio Sale, they're waiving their fee on those assets, not the actions of an external manager parasite trying to extract maximum value from its BDC host.  Given BlackRock's size, this is a tiny drop in the bucket for their AUM, their reputation is worth far more than any management fees they'll forego selling or merging TCPC away.
  • The external management agreement is fairly kind to shareholders as there is no termination fee due to BlackRock in a change of control transaction.
  • Both the CEO and COO of TCPC resigned from BlackRock in September.
I could see two possible transaction paths:
Like many other large alternative managers, BlackRock has a non-traded BDC targeted at the wealth channel, "BDEBT", that shares management with TCPC and many credits overlap between the two funds.  Although, BDEBT is very clean, minimal equity exposure and almost entirely first-lien senior secured loans, it has the liquidity to buy TCPC ex-cash (maybe the cash could be distributed to shareholders immediately before the merger) but might want to leave behind or otherwise monetize the nonsense to avoid polluting BDEBT's portfolio.  A BlackRock deal would retain the AUM and likely is the best outcome for shareholders.  Otherwise, similar to the recently announced ARCC/MFIC deal, a peer that trades near NAV could come in and offer shares for TCPC, increasing the buyers AUM.

I'd put my blended average outcome of about $5.25 in value, or a ~27% upside to today's $4.11 share price.

Risks:

  • Strategic review ends with independence: TCPC could rebuild the portfolio, re-lever and preserve the fee stream, leaving the NAV discount unresolved.
  • 36th Street Capital Partners: ~20% of NAV linked to a controlled equipment-finance platform that a buyer might not be interested in or require a specific valuation haircut.
  • Software exposure: 25.7% of remaining portfolio is software, PIK income and stressed credits can continue to reduce NAV if the process drags on.

Disclosure: I own shares of TCPC

Braemar Hotels & Resorts: Updated Thoughts, Needs to be Sold

A reader asked for a new model on Braemar Hotels & Resorts (BHR), a luxury hotel REIT that I've personally lost a lot of money on in the past year.  My original thesis rested on former external manager Ashford Inc selling BHR outright and collecting their termination payment, but some noisy activists scared away potential buyers who were afraid any acquisition wouldn't be approved by shareholders.  Instead, BHR choose to sell off enough assets to pay the Ashford termination fee and internalize.  Following the internalization, corporate overhead costs have come down substantially, but still eat up roughly half of the free cash flow available to the equity as the company is subscale and has no business being independent.  Below is my quick model on the standalone value of the company:

The current stock price is too cheap, it should probably be trading closer to a 10% FCF yield of around ~$2.25/share, but its still a little hairy and probably deserves a discount today.  Where things really get interesting is in a sale of the company.  At the upcoming annual meeting on 12/21/2026, shareholders will vote to approve a new performance incentive plan for management, once approved, shortly after (sometime in Q1 2027) management will get RSUs or options at this depressed price.  Now that Braemar is no longer externally managed, has a fresh independent board and a financially incentivized management, a sale of the company should be the likely outcome.  Braemar's cost of capital is far too high to pursue acquisitions and they're too small to justify corporate overhead.

Below is my updated math on what a sale could bring, to be conservative I added a $100MM fudge factor for any frictional costs and/or capex reserves that a buyer might negotiate as part of a sale.

I get a sale value of something close to $7/share, probably wildly optimistic, but with the amount of leveraged created by the debt and preferred stock, realization of net asset value could produce multiples of the current stock price.  Risks clearly include a dip in the economy, hotels are highly sensitive to consumer spending, although the upper class that BHR caters too have generally been immune to recent tighter wallets.

It might be giving bagholder vibes, but I think something happens in 2027.

Disclosure: I owns shares of BHR

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Seritage Growth Properties: Final Stages of Liquidation

Seritage Growth Properties (SRG) (~$90MM market cap) is the former PropCo formed in a 2015 rights offering to hold a portfolio of Sears (SHLD) free-standing and mall adjacent locations.  The original idea was to renovate and lease the former Sears boxes as they became vacant, eventually turning into a diversified retail REIT.  That thesis never sit well with me because many of their properties were attached to dying malls they didn't own or control (SRG just owned the Sears anchor location), plus as a REIT (SRG converted to a C-Corp in 2022) they had to payout substantially all of their cash flow to shareholders making it challenging to fund the remodel.  The strategy eventually failed and company's shareholders approved a liquidation ("Plan of Sale") on 10/24/22, the sale process has been ongoing since with several disappointments along the way.  Just about any and all enthusiasm for the former special situation darling is gone.  Today, only 8 real estate assets remain, the liquidation should be in its final stages and wrapped up within the next 1-2 years (famous last words!).

The remaining real estate (valuations are my estimates, played around with some AI tools to validate, should be reasonably conservative but feel free to push back):

  • King of Prussia: This is the old Sears anchor location attached to the large class A mall in suburban Philadelphia owned by Simon Property Group (SPG).  It's partially stabilized with tenants including Dick's Sporting Goods, Primark and Yard House, but it has a 34k SF vacancy that its been trying to fill since 2020.
  • Park Heritage Dallas: Another former Sears anchor mall location, back in June of this year, SRG entered into an option purchase and sale agreement with a developer for $50.8MM.  The buyer is paying a monthly payment ($126,900/month in 2026, bumping up to $274,950/month in 2027) until they close (expiration date of 1/31/28).
  • Overlake Plaza: This property is a free standing big-box redevelopment, the property has been rezoned for mixed use and sits pretty closely to Microsoft's campus.
  • Westfield UTC: Alongside JV partner Invesco, located in San Diego, the current property is a former Sears anchor mall location redeveloped into mixed use retail/office with some land optionality for additional mixed use development.  This property is likely the fulcrum asset with a lot of valuation uncertainty.  We don't know the terms of the Amazon lease or a lot of details around the structure of the JV, but based on the ~$15MM NOI, this asset could be the most valuable remaining.  The owner of the mall, URW, entered into a deal in June to purchase out their own JV partner for $705MM, implying a $1.4B valuation for what URW calls a "A++" asset, they'd be a natural buyer for the SRG property.
  • The other four unconsolidated properties are in various stages of redevelopment and are likely less meaningful to the final liquidation value.
Here's my back of the envelope math on SRG's liquidation value:

The question with all real estate liquidations in particular is "how long will it take?", here with SRG we're already into year 5 of the Plan of Sale.  The time issue is of critical importance due to the ~$20MM annual corporate overhead, arguably ridiculous for what's a relatively small asset base and a tiny market cap.  A couple of interesting nuggets that may suggest added pressure to wrap things up: 1) CEO Adam Metz (former CEO of GGP that led it through restructuring) signed a 6-month employment agreement in July with a company option for another 6-months; 2) At the most annual shareholder meeting, none of the six directors received the requisite 2/3rds affirmative vote (Eddie Lampert continues to own 23.8% of the company), however due to SRG's Maryland domicile, all were retained anyway.

The preferred stock is also an interesting security, even in a pretty bearish scenario the remaining assets should more than cover the $70MM liquidation preference, yet it trades at a little over $20/share.  The biggest concern with preferred stock is the possibility of being orphaned in a change of control transaction, but with minimal cash flow and no real franchise value to the remaining assets, I don't see a potential buyer retaining the SRG corporate structure and preferred stock.  But it's a small possibility (if SPG buys it, maybe?).  I don't own any of the preferred stock at the moment, but considering it.

Disclosure: I own shares of SRG

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Artiva Biotherapeutics: Busted Biotech

Apologies for the long layoff, I suddenly found myself important at work and have had to reduce my time spent on investing/blogging.  No promises, but I hope to be more active again.  A quick return to blogging post:

Artiva Biotherapeutics (ARTV) (~$210MM market cap) was a development stage biotech focused on its lead asset, AlloNK, a treatment for autoimmune diseases.  This past May, the company raised $300MM to fund AlloNK's development, however things quickly turned tragic when the company announced on 10/27 they were shutting down clinical trials, terminating 94% of their workforce and pursuing strategic alternatives following two deaths occurring in their trial.  

The combination of significant cash on the balance sheet and a complete white flag on development makes this a compelling busted biotech.  Below is my back-of-envelope liquidation math:

RA Capital owns about 38% of the company, a near controlling stake, which could lean towards a reverse merger.  Although, I would expect a reverse merger to include a pre-closing dividend, possibly a CVR (although the IP might not be worth much here) and a PIPE of new investors, the current price of $4.12 provides nice downside protection.

Disclosure: I own shares of ARTV

Friday, June 12, 2026

Braemar Hotels & Resorts: Internalizing Management

Throwing together a quick note on Braemar Hotels & Resorts (BHR) (~$180MM market cap) before I start a busy Friday, forgive me if there are any glaring mistakes, I'll come back and fix them over the weekend.  Today, BHR announced the conclusion of their strategic review, originally it was a sale process, but now the luxury hotel REIT is going to internalize management and distance itself from its external manager, Ashford Inc.  My first take is this move is designed to get Ashford Inc its $480MM termination fee without being subject to a shareholder vote (10% holder Al Shams Investments Ltd has been vocal in trying to block this payment to Monty Bennett) that would come with a full sale of the company.  BHR recently announced the sale of 3 hotels for a total of $437.5MM (12.5x hotel EBITDA by my math) that along with cash on the balance sheet, should be sufficient to payoff Monty.  Ashford directors are resigning, the board will be refreshed, and the new REIT will be free to pursue life without external management conflicts.

Post-internalization, this will be a pretty small subscale REIT that should attract takeover attention.  Hotel REITs have been performing exceptionally this year, the top of the K-shaped economy is doing well, especially with all the Mag7 stock comp and AI IPO money hitting the upper class brokerage accounts.  Below is my back of envelope of what BHR might fetch in a sale (so its not including corporate overhead as a standalone to be clear):


I own too much of this to begin with, but depending on where it trades today, could be provide an interesting entry point for those on the sideline now that Ashford will be out of the picture.  Some of these properties are exceptional assets that any number of other REITs or private investors would gladly scoop up.

Disclosure: I own shares of BHR

Monday, June 1, 2026

Investcorp Credit Management BDC: Visiting the Private Credit Garbage Bin

Investcorp Credit Management BDC (ICMB) ($17MM market cap) is a distressed subscale BDC that was forced to refinance maturing debt in March with an affiliate of the external manager, post refinancing, the economics of being a standalone BDC don't work and the board commenced a review of strategic alternatives led by a committee of independent directors (including Lee Shaiman, former head of the LSTA, bank loan market's trade organization and Thomas Sullivan who was on the SMTA board).  Since then, NAV has eroded to $3.65/share (versus a current quote of $1.20/share), Houlihan Lokey has been formally engaged as an advisor, the external manager has waived a bulk of their fees and closed-fund activist Bulldog Investors (4.1% owner) issued a letter demanding the external manager buy-in the outstanding shares at NAV.  This needs to be sold quick, its a melting ice cube splayed out on a hot summer day asphalt driveway.

BDCs are just pools of assets, they can be sold and merged away fairly easily to any number of eager asset managers looking to bulk up their AUM and resulting management fees.  Most of these deals happen at an NAV-for-NAV basis, so we're looking for a BDC with a smaller discount (just about all of them) to come in and merge away ICMB.  Often there's also a little cash kicker for shareholders to encourage them to vote yes and serves as compensation for entering into a new external management agreement.  ICMB's manager, Investcorp, should be incentivized to accept almost any deal, they own 25% of the BDC, have been waiving management fees and luckily for shareholders, don't appear to have a termination fee.  Reputationally, they'll want to move on from this experiment.

Below is little math based on our current favorite BDC consolidator, BCP Investment Corp (BCIC), assuming an NAV-for-NAV merger, ICMB could see significant upside.  BCIC is just an example, could be a number of potential BDC buyers or if Bulldog has its way, Investcorp might buy it into one of their other strategies (similar to Apollo with ARI) to save face.


This is an illiquid microcap with an upside down balance sheet, if it doesn't get wrapped up fairly quickly, all equity could get wiped out.

Disclosure: I own shares of ICMB