Apologies, this post is mostly for my benefit (I try to post on all new positions), there likey aren't any new thoughts below on combination of the country's two largest traditional grocery chains, Albertsons (ACI) and Kroger (KR), but I just wanted to acknowledge that I bought into the merger arb earlier this week. Partially after hearing Andrew Walker and Daniel Biolsi discuss it in a recent Yet Another Value Podcast episode.
Nearly a year ago, the two announced that Kroger (~2700 stores) was buying Albertsons (~2300 stores) for $34.10/share in cash (the merger consideration has been adjusted down to $27.25 for a $6.85 special cash dividend ACI paid in early 2023), shares closed on Friday for $23.63, offering 15% upside to the adjusted closing price for a deal that is expected to close in early 2024. Potentially a juicy IRR.
On its face, the merger appeares to have a significant anti-trust hurdles, but when you examine the industry, traditional grocers like KR and ACI are facing competitive pressure from big box stores like Walmart, Target and Costco, plus competition on the high end from specialty grocers like Sprouts and Whole Foods. They've been share losers to both sides. Although others don't always see it that way, regulators took a narrow view of the office supply industry and rejected the attempted Staples and Office Depot 2014 tie up, despite many alternative channels (notably Amazon) to buy office supplies. Both companies have struggled since, hopefully regulators take a more holistic view here and realize that traditional grocery chains need a strong competitor to the big box concepts (Walmart, Target) that use grocery as an enticement to get shoppers into their stores to buy higher margin non-grocery goods.
From a Chicagoan's point of view (they have overlap significantly here), I was a bit surprised by the relative lack of overlap in the two chain's store map nationally. Kroger has significant concentration in the midwest and southeast where Albertsons is generally absent, and Albertsons is more focused on the west coast and northeast where Kroger has less of a presence (other than Denver, Seattle, Southern CA):
To address the areas where they do have overlap, when the deal was initially struck, the two set the stage for a divestiture SpinCo that would house between 100 to 375 grocery stores. In addition to the adjustment for the special dividend (since paid), the cash consideration was to be dropped by 3x the four-wall (store level, pre corporate overhead) EBITDA of the stores assigned to the SpinCo. Traditional merger arbitrage investors don't like uncertainty in the total consideration, the ACI SpinCo (in the initial docs, it appeared that SpinCo would be ACI stores only) would have likely traded poorly or at had some uncertainty as to its public market valuation. This uncertainty (in my view) has partially led to the wide merger arbitrage spread, along with concerns around regulatory approval.
Today's news that Kroger and Albertsons had reached a deal to sell 413 stores for $1.9B to C&S Wholesale Grocers ("C &S") should help in a couple ways:
- Divesting the overlap stores in an arm's length transaction should help calm fears that a SpinCo would be filled with the worst stores and be destined to fail. A spin would not have been arms length and could have been the ultimate garbage barge, but now the divested stores will be plugged into an established operator who has done their due diligence and should be ready to compete against the combined KR/ACI following the closing of the deal. That couldn't be said for a spin structure.
- If required by regulators, KR/ACI has also setup an option for C&S to buy an additional 237 stores if needed. In the initial merger proxy, the two parties speculated that up to 600 stores would need to be divested in total, this option would firm that up and fully eliminate the need for a spinoff of uncertain value.
- The original spin appeared to only for ACI shareholders, this divestiture package includes both ACI and KR stores, again highlighting that a third party fully evaluated the competitive position in each market, versus a dump into a SpinCo that might have failed.
- Similar to above, but grocery stores are heavily unionized, by selling in an arm's length transaction versus a spin, this structure likely helps dispel fears that a SpinCo would fail or that stores would be closed. C&W has committed to keeping stores open as-is which should help political perceptions around this combination.
That's pretty much my thesis, the divestiture firms up the merger consideration (shouldn't need the SpinCo any longer) and should appease regulators that a strong third party (versus a helpless SpinCo) has done their due diligence and purchased the divested stores in an arm's length transaction, thus ensuring proper competition. Assuming this deal closes in mid-February, even after this week's run up, it is offering a 15% absolute return and a ~38% IRR.
If the merger is blocked or otherwise doesn't occur, Albertsons is valued at 8x earnings (roughly inline with peers) and is a semi-controlled company by Cerberus and other PE investors with capital allocation expertise. The downside doesn't appear too significant.
Disclosure: I own shares of ACI
Purely as a curiosity, what would you pay for an ACI “garbage barge” spinco, if one was created? It’s a tough valuation exercise.
ReplyDeleteMy instinct is $0, but that can’t be right. Some fraction of NWC maybe?
But it’s a grocer, it probably runs negative NWC. Yeah, tough…
DeleteYeah, probably close to $0, maybe I would have given it a $1 in the SOTP. In the advisor analysis the closer the number of stores to 100, the lower the value, overhead and lack of scale eliminated any EBITDA. The lowest comps are around 3.5x EBITDA.
DeleteBut you're right, tough valuation exercise, that now has likely been eliminated and should firm up the merger consideration.
What’s KR’s upside assuming the deal goes through?
ReplyDeleteSorry, I don't really have a view on KR. It is a cash deal, I don't plan on buying the merged KR.
DeleteWhat's your process for analyzing the probability that merger arbitrages like this goes through? Even after electing to spin off as much as 600 stores, the spread is still pretty wide, which is surprising since there are so many eyes on this, not a random small or micro-cap. I know it's hard to know exactly how to avoid "upsetting the applecart", but the expected value given the risks seems attractive
ReplyDeleteI'm just a retail investor, so I don't have a sophisticated model to determine the probability here. But several other controversial deals have gone through recently after some divestitures and compromise, don't really see why this one wouldn't? They're divesting their overlapping stores, otherwise have fairly complementary maps, committing to keeping union jobs/stores, etc.
DeleteYet another great write-up! Apologies for I have not read the full merger announcement, but I couldn't see the $27.25 per share take-out price anywhere in the C&S divestiture announcement either. Is your read that the $27.25 will stay fixed irrespective of how many stores C&S takes (in which case agree with you this is a great deal) or will it somehow flex? (feel free to send me to go do one and do my own reading!)
ReplyDeleteI believe so yes, maybe others can chime in too. But the merger agreement reduces the $34.10 by the spinco value and the special dividend (which was already paid). I think this takes a spin off of the table, but could be wrong about that, if there is a spinco, guessing it would be closer to the 100 store number and thus reduce the merger consideration by only a small amount.
DeleteI had a read of the merger agreement and another read of the C&S press release. The original merger agreement had an agreed Price Per Share consideration formula based on the 3x Four Wall EBITDA (that's a new one for me!) of the SpinCo stores. Meanwhile the press release is worded as a fixed consideration of $1.9bn for the initial C&S stores with an an undisclosed adjustment formula if more stores are added. Crucially, the press release reads very much as if the C&S divestiture happens immediately after Kroger acquires Albertsons rather than immediately before. There is also a comment that says "Consequently, the spin-off previously contemplated by Kroger and Albertsons Cos. is no longer a requirement under the merger agreement and will no longer be pursued by Kroger and Albertsons Cos." which supports that.
DeleteIf I'm right in all of that, it means that Albertson's shareholders are actually taking a haircut on the divested stores - because the original consideration would have included them getting shares in the SpinCo. Now it looks like there is no more a SpinCo, but the consideration hasn't gone up. Either way, from a merger arb perspective this is reduced uncertainty even though the consideration looks to have been reduced.
Actually sorry - i re-read that. They're not taking a hair cut - previously they would have had $1 in SpinCo for every $1 the price paid per share was reduced. The recut formula pins this at $0 in SpinCo value and $0 in price per share reduction.
DeleteI have been thinking of this for some time as well... Doesn't make sense to own others in the same industry as ACI appears cheaper and has this "option". The company is in play and I agree that even if the deal falls apart, it doesn't have a big downside risk than other arb ideas. Thank you for your post!
ReplyDeleteAre you concerned about a protracted legal fight? While I agree ACI has a strong case and has a very high chance of winning any lawsuit, I do question how long a potential lawsuit could take. It could drag on for several months and that’s my biggest concern. Do you think a mid February close date is optimistic?
ReplyDeleteAdding to this, the Lawsuit against SAVE was announced in March and is only now going to trial
DeleteThe biggest risk is how well they fight in court and then its up to one judge! The lawyers in Walgreens/RiteAid merger certainly did a poor job of presenting their case. Regulators were narrow minded in the proposed Walgreens/RiteAid merger and now RiteAid is on the ropes. But that doesn't seem to deter the regulators from their foolhardy pursuit of backward looking merger challenges. They look at the retail landscape through the 1990s glasses.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.seattletimes.com/business/retail/wa-attorney-general-sues-to-block-kroger-albertsons-merger/
ReplyDeleteI think the timeline here will likely be much longer than originally anticipated.
Yes, the two companies admitted as much, over the weekend they put out a press release with a revised time of August.
DeleteWelp! There goes my calls.
DeleteCurious do you have any updated thoughts on this? The stock is holding up pretty well despite JBLU’s lost trial.
ReplyDeleteIt's a good question, I don't have updated thoughts, but I'm a bit surprised it is holding up well as you noted. Maybe that's a sign I should sell some/all.
DeleteI'm sorry for sounding like a complete dolt but I'm newer to analyzing these merger arb situations. Why do you take the stock price holding up as a sign to sell the stock? Do you believe that this potential would lead to a much higher downside than was originally anticipated? The stock is still trading ~8-9x earnings so the downside still seems to be limited, unlike where JetBlue has negative earnings & a bankruptcy risk attached to it
DeleteIt was just an off the cuff comment, I haven't sold any ACI, although it is a relatively small position. As you suggest, Albertsons is a profitable company at a reasonable valuation. Plus you have PE owners who likely still want to sell the company, whether its to KR or in some other transaction.
Delete